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By 
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University af Tasmania. 
The spate af "new" psychologies with which 
we were familiar in the nineteen-twenties (to say 
nothing of the nineteen-tens and !the eighteen-
nineties) has died down, and psychologists now 
talk in terms of points of view and preferred con-
cepts rather than party allegiances. Nevertheless, 
one impression persists which needs to be enquired 
into. Amang those interested in ,the subject, but 
not themselves psychologists, it takes this form: 
psychalogy is in continuous, large scale flux, and 
is therefore a new-fangled, insecure, aggressive, 
and rather" gimmicky" field of endeavour. Amang 
psychologists themselves, the assumption is more 
specific and sophisticated: it is, that psychology 
became respectable with the rise of experimentalism 
(with the foundation by Wilhelm Wundt of the 
laboratory at Leipzig in 1879, if 'an exact date is 
wanted), and that previous work can be relegated 
to a species of antiquarian rag-bag, or rubbish-heap 
of superstition. 
True, any standard history will show that this 
is by no means correct, and when a psychologist 
directs his attention specifically to the history of 
his specialty within the subject, he keeps finding 
anticipations of concepts he works with now. 
Nevertheless, the psychologist who is primarily a 
historian-psychologist remains uneasy. He feels 
that his professional ancestors are not recognized 
at their true level of attainment. The nature of 
human beings, as revealed by their behaviour and 
their reports of experience (to take no wider a 
field) is a continuing, ,enduring part of our world, 
as we contemplate it and ask ourselves questions 
about It. The sense of the word psychology may 
change, but the fact of solid, continuing, and sober 
contribution to the answering of these questions 
has been a feature of thought, European and other, 
for many centuries. (Sober at least in terms of 
effort, perseverance, and sincerity, if not in terms 
of concepts.) The impression which this article 
will try to specify and to substantiate, then, is this: 
given human nature (which has not changed 
radically in the past century), and given persistent 
effort to understand it, is it not likely that psy-
chology will possess through that period a common 
body of subject-matter and attitude to it which 
will remain unaltered in essence despite change in 
method and approach? Does this mean that the 
non-experimental psychology of the earlier nine-
teenth century has been undervalued? Does it 
mean, further, that the pre-experimental psy-
chology and the experimental alike are expres-
sions in differing idioms of a basic perennial 
psychology, and that if either diverges from this 
the divergence is only apparent, or erroneous, or 
not relevant to psychology at all? 
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The importance of ,this argument, its difficulties, 
and its fruitfulness for understanding are best 
illustrated by an example. A persistent problem of 
psychology, experimental or not, is the vast growth 
in complexity, richness, modifiability, and effec-
tiveness which the behaviour of living creatures 
exhibits as they progress from infancy to maturity. 
Part of the suggested explanation is that as 
creatures develop they acquire new motives. There 
are rival definitions of motive i,tself, but here we 
may take the broadest current one" any state or 
event within the organism that (under appropriate 
circumstances) initiates or regulates behaviour in 
relation ,to a goal.'" Now let us compare and con-
trast a pre-experimental and an experimental 
discussion of the acquisition of motives, the appear-
ance in the individual of states or events,as 
initiating behaviour which earlier in the life-his,tory 
they did not do. For succinctness and ease of 
recollection we shall call these the case of the 
money-mad miser (pre-experimental) and the 
case of the cue-crazed ewe (present-day). 
First, the old-'time miser: just over a century ago 
the first great textbook in psychology appeared. 
Its author, Alexander Bain, is remembered for 
accurate, detailed, comprehensive, and indefatigable 
observation. His 'treatment of the miser (a familiar 
figure in previous literature) is selected therefore 
as likely to show the main features of pre-experi-
mental method and 'approach, and to do justice 
to this kind of psychology. 
It is well-known (says Bain) thllit many 
things sought, in the first instance, as means, 
come, at last, to have a force in themselves, 
without any regard ,to those very ulterior con-
sequences, but for which they would never have 
been taken up. The acquisition of money once 
commenced, one is apt to get a fascination for 
the thing itself, although, strictly speaking, 
that has no real value. The truth seems to be, 
that with the handling of the universal medium 
of purchase, a new susceptibiUty is developed, 
there being something in the form and manner 
of the object that commends it to the mind. 
A latent taste is incidentally made manifest, 
and the gratification of it brings a new end ": 
Such is Bain's description of a familiar course of 
development, in which something that is not an 
original end of one's nature (such as ,the slaking of 
thirst) becomes such an end, a mover to action, 
through experience, or in more recent terms, 
through social learning, "a learning process in 
which social demands are the determining con-
ditions ": 
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Second, the present-day sheep: this creature 
appears in a situation where, as R. S. Woodworth 
said in effect, "any means employed to reach a 
goal [cf. Bain's might subsequently become 
a motive in its own or, in terms of his own 
formulation, mechanism might become a drive. 
In essence. this the first formulation of the doc-
trine Gord.on Allport to label the ' functional 
autonomy of motives' ". This writer, D. B. 
then quotes at length from a study by H. S. 
on neuroses in sheep and goats. Liddell refers 1,0 
"a scuree of annoyance and frustration in our 
study of learning ", tho" sheep's insistence on run~, 
ning through the maze for its .own reasons-not 
for the reaScJllS or 'motives' that we attribut.ed to 
it ".' The particular situation was, that the 
(plural! were learning a maze (cf. money 
in which the reward (ef. the j,hings money 
was either food or return 1,0 the floclc 
" In of their invariable mistakes (C;;D-
tinues ), the normal sheep seemed eager 
to run the maze day aftcr day. The experi·· 
menter, on coming into the barn to start the 
day's w.ork, would regularly find these animals 
clustered about the screen-door leading to the 
maze as children congregate around the ticket-
window for the Sa,turday-af;ternoon movie. 
When they reached tho food·-box at 'the end 
of the maze, they often did not delay there. 
One mature ewe was always in a hurry for the 
next trial. At the food box she rubbed her 
snout along the surface of the oats perfunc-
torily, sometimes tal~ing a small bite, and in 
one continuously wheeling motion rushed oft· 
to the startinp-: gate again . .. IIer maze 
activity was coinpletely absorbing'. The sheep 
obviously was not motivated to exercise her 
defective skill in the alternating maze 
either by longing for the reward of food or by 
the prompting of a. gregarious instinct. She 
ordinarily ate little or nothing from the box 
.of oats and we found that shutting out the 
sight of the flock by closing ,the wooden storm 
door to the barn did not startle or disturb 
her. We may conclude that the running of 
the maze wa,s a self-rewarding activity which 
was also self-perpetuating "." 
Now as to resemblances and differences of these 
two examples. Firstly, Bain deals with human 
beings, Liddell with animals. Secondly. the former 
speaks of fascination, susceptibility, taste, gratifi-
cation: the latter of reward, activity, and behaviour 
in detail, although he admits eagerness, absorption, 
and longing. Bain deals in terms of anecdote, 
Liddell in those of experiment. 
The apparent contrast in the choice between 
human and animal behaviour is no contrast. Bain 
describes animal behaviour in detail elsewhere, 
especially in his early work Animal Instincts and 
Intelligence, where his view of psychology is 
remarkably " modern" in that he says" A mistaken 
fear of submerging the dignity of man should not 
prevent us from identifying the superior and in-
ferior types of animal existence to the full extent 
of their agreement.'" This view he justifies in 
the words: "the nervous system is the medium of 
all the instinctive, emotional, intelligent and active 
of the animal; in so far as it is similar 
two differont creatures, these processes are 
usual;y found to be similar."" 
The diIfelcnce bc)tween the anec :lotal and the 
experimental aspects, however, is striking, The 
since It general or imaginD,tive 
be held t.o over-stress the (1iver-
the old and the new 
insGance more linked 
redress any u'lfairneGs in this Thus Bain 
elsewhere: "To bypochondria, 
alarm, from a mental ciepre3sion indicative 
of actual is at all times: 
be 
if the person was 
degrees of the healthy 
unhcalthy influences, as atmosphere and the like; 
in other '.'/Drds, whether therc was a 
keen con~ciou~ile,;S of states. 
Lord JefIl'ey was a man of sort ".' At; aneeclcte 
thls is cioseIy linked to fact, 1,0 an individual. 
it occurs lit was selected by chancc) in an 
area where is still clinical rather thfl.ll experi-
me:ntal. It the great observai"ional 
attainment of in personality study without 
lessening the gap between him and present-day 
writers, speaking. As to the con-
trast in vocabulary, " irmer·-nez;s" of B'lin's 
terms, as opposed to the "outer-ness" of 
's, is and a line of cQntrast 
to be recognized 
l~aking aneectoLalism, and" Inner-ness Jj 
we have an in(iieation of Lhe serious 
can be brought against psychology berore 1879. It 
is. that psychology then lacked the methodological 
ballast that experiment provides, and so was liable 
to be tossed about by the wild winds of speculation, 
imagination, and downright phantasy. To make 
matters worse, aneccIotalism deprived psychology 
of the measure of anchoring that strict observation 
would have provided.'" These attacks are serious, 
but not so uniformly damning to the pre-experi-
mental psychology as many have thought, Leaving 
moderate authors like Bain for the moment, let us 
CCl'lsider what really extreme writers, whether 
ancient or modern, can do. An author who eon-
I"ciously tries to combine the merits and avoid the 
defects of Hegel and Schleiermacher is not likely 
to be lucid, factual, or concise-" scientific ", so to 
speak. Indeed he runs grave risk of plumbing 
depths of incomprehensibility never attained by his 
mentors." The kind of psychology that emerges 
may be iEustra,ted thus: both Hegel and 8c111e1e1'-
mache1' assume Being as the foundatIon of their 
systematic constructions (from which their psy-
chologies stem). But Leopold George says that if 
Being is assumed, then one runs into systematie 
difficulties at once, and the only way to avoid these 
is to drop" all presuppositions and start with what 
scepticism itself never doubts, namely, nothing "." 
Thus George starts from a metaphysic with a catch 
in it. Building on this, and taking what he wants 
from Hegel and Sehleiermacher, he produces an 
ordered explanation of reality by a system of cate-
gories \vhieh nm in nines, with this result for 
psychology: "Since spirit is the sum and substance 
of all these catwories, everything which proceeds 
from spirit is subject to them. Accordingly, there-
fore, thought is; and psychology in the part in 
J. A. CARDNO 35 
which it treats of thought, will have to show why 
though t is bound down by these definite rules".13 
At one level this may appear to be explanation of 
the nature of the universe, at another the con-
triving of a bed of Procrustes whieh is also a 
labyrinth, in whieh the reader is lost and human 
nature contorted into strange and fearsome shapes. 
A standard historian of the period aliows that j,his "contains some isolated points of value. But 
the systematizing spirit (he adds) overrules these 
tendencies and the work is cast in the dialectical 
form of a ninefold evolution out of nothing "."1 
Psychologically, the weakness of such a system is 
that the author's observaUon of experience is 
bound to come in conflict with his preconceived 
notions. POI' instance, in George's psychology 
motion plays a la.rge part, " so large, in fact" (says 
Brett) "that one might seem to be reading a 
physiological introduction to psychology until the 
artificial character of the exposition is grasped "."' 
This psychology (which is not the most extreme 
one can find) Brett characterized as a "curious 
mixture of sound sense and cosmic rhythms "."" 
The cosmic rhythms, not the sound sense, were the 
feature of it most admired at the time. The sound 
sense, on the contrary, is the element which will justify this, or any other pre-experimental 
psychology. Accordingly the next step in assessing 
the permanent merit of the old psychology is to 
see what minimum common element, what enduring 
substra:tum of reasonable refiection on human 
nature, it has with the new, and what gross diver-
gences from it are fashionable, or have recently 
been so. Now, the most extreme contrast with 
George's cosmic psychology is the behavioural 
science (some even called it behaviouristics, not 
psychology atalD which aims to depend on data 
words (terms used in describing what happens,) 
and deprecates or rejec:ts outright concepts which 
are intuitive, that is, according to these writers, 
"undefinable without the introduction of non-
empirical, non-objective sets of referents, and 
hence ... (without) plac.o in scientific statement."" 
(These" intuitive" concepts are the very ones that 
a speculative or " cosmic" psychologist like George 
depends on most.) The writer just referred to, 
W. S. Verplanck, aims to provide "an empirical 
vocabulary that can be used by anyone in the 
science of 'human' or ' animal' behaviour "."S His 
general attitude may be fairly illustrated by two 
quotations. First, he remarks "I suspect that a 
major part of the behaviourist's problem is to pro-
vide a scientific account of how and why intuitive 
concepts are developed and used, that is, to 
, explain' them in terms of human verbal behaviour 
and discriminativ.o control "." This is the furthest 
concession Verplanck will make to intuition. He 
adds, however, that such concepts "do not belong 
in statements of fact or in statements of theory set 
up to deal with fact ".20 Second, Verplanck's own 
personal experience of intuitive concepts is 
entirely negative: "the writer remains ignorant of 
what a cognition is. So far as he knows, he has 
never had one, and no one has ever been able to 
correct him on this, or tell him how to have on.o, 
or how to recognize it if he did ".21 In fact, perfectly 
intelligible, widely accepted, middle-of-the-road 
definitions of cognition exist. English and English, 
for instance, do not recomr 1end the va<:rue popular 
use "the awareness of objects ". but they record 
without criticism the traditional meaning "a 
generic term tor any process whereby an organism 
becomes aware or obtains knowledge of an object."" 
They quote also the behaviouristic definition "a 
hypothetical stimulus-stimulus association or per-
ceptual organization inferred to account for 
expectancies "." The reader may care to ponder 
these defiintiol1s, follow up the cross-references 
which English and English provide, and note that 
they say also of this term " Although it is part of 
the tradit~onal terminology and has subjective 
connotations, many neobehaviourists use (it) ".25 
If he does so, he will be well started on the 
to judging how both "cosmic" and "scientific 
psychologies may have their eccentricities, and how 
important the common element of common sense is. 
More speCifically, behaviouristic psychology, like 
that of George and his peers at the other extreme, 
is the end-resul:t of a process. This process is that 
of working through ,the possible applications of a 
standpoint to the explanation of behaviour, with 
complete logic but incomplete common sense, and 
little if any humour in each case. The behaviouris-
tic standpoint is this: that psychology must deal in 
terms of material fact, be philosophy-free, and enjoy 
entire immunity from inturtion, feeling and what 
mig-ht be called the literary side of life in generaL 
A statement (now itseU historic) by J. B. Watson 
will indicate the basic doctrine which underlies all 
this: "It is granted that the behaviour of animals 
can be investig.a:ted without appeal to consciousness 
... The position is taken here that the behaviour of 
man and the behaviour of animals must be con-
sidered on the same plane .. ,26 
We have now shown the consequences of two 
extreme views of psychology, the one" old ", specu-
lative, and metaphysical, the other" new", experi-
mental, and "noll-metaphysical". Both, it has 
been shown, can run into 'the dangerous position 
of transgressing the deliverances of experience as 
expressed in common sense, and experiment is no 
safer than speculation, let alone anecdote, in this 
regard. So far the old psychology is at no dis-
advantage. But two more radical issues now face 
us. First, metaphysics: is the affirmation of this 
a meri:t or demerit in the old psychology? Can we 
find an optimum proportion of metaphysical 
thought in psychology which will justify us for 
critiCizing George as over-metaphysical and Watson 
as under-metaphysical, aU in the same breath. 
Second (and more important) can it be shown that 
there was a central body of " old psychology" which 
agreed on allowing metaphysics at this level, what-
ever other divergences it showed? 
On the first issue, metaphysics has been defined 
as "that branch of philosophy concerned with the 
ultimate nature of existence ".27 This study, 
according to the writers quoted, has "no place in 
the science of psychology", and metaphysical is a 
term of reproach, "nearly always ".28 This would 
embrace propositions like those made by George 
about nothingness, and here we would have to 
agree. But English and English also recognize 
metapsychology. This, on one definition. is "a 
systematic attempt to deal with what lies beyond 
the empirical facts and laws of psychology"" It is 
"related to psychology as metaphysics was to 
physiCS in Aristotle's system"; it includes "the 
problems of relation of minda.nd body, of 'the place 
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of mind and behaviour in the cosmos, &C,,,30 
Curiously enough, English and English themselves 
refer elsewhere to the mind-body problem (the 
relation of mind, or that which is mental, to the 
body), as a metaphysical issue, going behind the 
empirical relationships to the ultimate one, often 
"unwittingly introduced" into psychology (and 
irrelevantly so, they argue) because of overlap 
between metaphysical and psychological terms,31 
This dictionary rightly reflects the major present 
day divergence of view on these matters, If one 
takes the position 'Of some philosophers, that the 
problem is unreal, then one will side with Verplanck 
and Watson, to name only those we have mentioned, 
and" old" psychology is of no importance, though 
old" physiology is, If, however, one allows that 
the mind-body problem is a real problem, and that 
the area called metapsychology is an area where 
meaningful propositions may be made, then the 
pre-experimental psychologies are worth consider-
ing, and while some may be el'l'oneous, others may 
not. 
Next, if you exclude mind (or soul or spirit for 
that matter) from psychology, you are assuming 
that it does not exist, 01' that its importance is 
negligible in relation to the understanding of 
behaviour, or that is is inaccessible to meaningful 
study, or possibly a variety of other things, In any 
case anti-metaphysical psychology assumes a meta-
physical pOSition, just as much as that which 
recognized metaphysics: in the study of human 
behaviour you cannot escape from the nature of 
things, and if you choose to ignore it you gravely 
limit the area of discourse. Our ancestors of a 
century ago were probably clearer on this point, 
for a dictionary then in current use recognizes that 
metaphysics can mean not only" hypeTphysicaZ, or 
that which is above and beyond nature ", but also 
"if [meta.] be interpreted, as it may, ,to mean 
along with, then rnetaphysics or metaphYSical 
philosophy will be that philosophy which we should 
take along with us into physics, and into every other 
philosophy--that knowledge of causes and principles 
which we should carry with us into every depart-
ment of inquiry'"'' This standpoint requires that 
you take the mind-body problem and the deter-
minism-indeterminism problem with you into your 
psychology. But if you assume determinism, or 
deny mind, you have already limited the explana-
tions you can give for behaviour, 
Now ironically enough, Bain himself, who among 
the old psychologists is much honoured as 'the 
(unconscious) ancestor of behaviourism, did not 
allow metaphysics to prejudge psychological issues 
on the mind-body problem, though he did on deter-
minism. Sometimes, indeed, he is accused of 
skating round the real body-mind problem, Those 
critics are more correct who remark that he 
"avoided the apparent crassness of a mechanistic 
system, He mades use of physiological principles for 
their practical us.efulness, not for philosophical 
purposes ","" The outcome of this, to follow R, S, 
Peters' version of Brett's famous history, is that 
Bain holds mind and body to be "one, a double-
faced unity"; "We are to deal with this, in the 
language of the Athanasian Creed, not confound-
ing the persons nor dividing the substance" (Bain's 
own wOl~ds) , and Bain was a true Aristotelian in his 
"grasp of the ideas of organism and activity",'" 
Though his method was the method of natural 
history, Bain's psychology remains a psychology 
with a metaphysic behind it, 
The pre-experimental psychology has now been 
shown, even if rather en passant, to have, at least 
in one of its central authors, not only a recognition 
of metaphysics, but discernible signs of kinship 
with Aristotle, the founding father of the whole 
discipline. Nevertheless, the question still remains, 
was there an old psychology different from the 
various new psychologies? The contrast between 
George and Bain would seem to indicate that there 
was not. However, a contrary view is possible, 
To demonstrate this, consider an author in some 
ways as different from Bain as is George, This 
was James McCosh, competitor with Bain for 
various academic appointments, Calvinist, whereas 
Bain was agnostic, a clergyman whereas Bain was 
anti-clerical, right-wing whereas Bain was radical. 
Now, McCosh (writing about the same time as 
Bain in the first edition of The Ernotions and the 
Will) defined the task of psychology as inquiry 
" into the operations of the mind of man with the 
view of discovering its laws and its faculties "." 
The most important aspect of this task, in relation 
to our previous argument, is the relation of 
psychology to the other moral sciences in the per-
f'Ormance of it, For McCosh, logic is the basic 
science of the laws of thought, and metaphysics 
that of the nature of being, But logic" throws us 
back on Psychology, not indeed to justify the laws, 
but to discover them ","" nor can metaphysics 
"attain anything like a scientific form, till 
psychology has made some progress, and taught us 
to distinguish between intuition and associated 
and allied states of mind ","' Psychology, here, is 
in the midst of the moral sciences, in the role not 
of master, nor servant, but of partner. Bain would 
not admit intuition in the same way as does 
McCosh, but he would agree on the need for the 
distinction between it and allied states. Moreover, 
Bain admits and stresses "consciousness, or the 
immediate feeling of the mind's doings "." This 
is an allied state (immediate feeling), though Bain 
remarks that" this has been ,too much looked upon 
by metaphysicians as the main source" of "know-
ledge respecting the Human Mind ","" 
Bain's two other sources, however, although 
diverging from those of McCosh, agree with those 
favoured in even less likely quarters, His recogni-
tion of the" anatomy and physiology of the human 
framework" 10 as a source of information about the 
mind, has already been noticed under other names: 
it forms a link with the physiologically minded 
psychologists from the eighteenth century (at least) 
to Watson, 'The difference is that the materialists 
and hehaviourists did not keep this SOUl'ce in pers-
pective as Bain did, and tried to reduce the products 
of the others to it. On the other side, Bain's 
emphasis on this third source, "Outward appear-
ances, actions, and works ", provides links with 
writers who themselves err by sectional over-empha-
sis, Thus Comte tried to reject introspection and 
the deliverances of consciousness in general and to 
reduce psychology to biology plus a social science 
yet to be developed, thus emphasizing two of Bain's 
three sources to-the detriment of the third," Other 
pre-experimental psychologists who overstressed 
the introspective sources could easily be cited 
besides George, 
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Once this principle of the three necessary sources 
of psychological knowledge is established, the 
central tradition of the old ps'ychology becomes 
clear. This tradition considers events in life-
histories as acts of whole creatures, not bits of 
behaviour, it ace.opts the organism as a unit, it 
listens to what talking organisms say about them-
selves, it has a place for the study of cultural 
artifacts as well as the twitching of muscles, for 
description of the phenomena of mino, as well as 
for the reporting of behaviour. On this basis, the 
alleged change from old to new with the coming 
of experiment appears rather as a suppression of 
one or two of the interest of 
or of any other 
or information. 
this, the 
of the three sources, 
days before for instance 
by G. H. Lewes, Herber"L Spencer, and many 
more whom one would even less to see brack-
e:ed On this showing. is a place in 
it for and Brentano, though many other 
famous reputations would need some re-valuing. 
This is material for future studies, however: for 
the moment it must be enough to have sketched 
the prima facie contrast between pre-experimental 
and experimental psychology, to have indicated 
that this contrast is not quite what it seems, and 
to have argued that the old psychology is :\n fact 
a perennial one, dependent on the recognition of 
the three sources which have been mentioned. 
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